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RETROACTIVE TAX RULES 
JAMES M. PUCKETT*
ABSTRACT
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. 
United States underscored the importance of a uniform approach to judicial review of ad-
ministrative action; accordingly, the Court clarified that tax administration is generally 
subject to the same review as other kinds of administrative action by other federal agencies. 
Tax guidance from the IRS and Treasury Department serves an important role in clarifying 
the tax law so that taxpayers may report their tax liability accurately and plan their affairs. 
Meanwhile, aggressive attempts by a relatively small number of taxpayers to avoid tax lia-
bility by exploiting arguable ambiguities in the tax law present a perennial challenge for tax 
administration. In either case, as long as statutory and regulatory ambiguities exist, some 
surprises in the form of retroactive resolutions of uncertain tax positions are inevitable; the 
issue is who decides? Because of the Internal Revenue Code’s unusual grant of retroactive 
rulemaking power to the Treasury Department, tax administration cannot simply be col-
lapsed with all other administrative action into a uniform framework of judicial review. This 
Article attempts to shed light on judicial review of more typical prospective tax guidance in 
part by drawing from the special case of retroactive tax guidance. This Article also argues 
that the general approach to judicial review of administrative action, as infused by the Code’s 
express grants of retroactive rulemaking power, affords the IRS and Treasury flexibility to 
make policy retroactively through rulemaking and receive deference from the courts. Moreo-
ver, though some constitutional limitations on retroactivity exist, the retroactive administra-
tive clarification of an ambiguity should not be unconstitutional. Finally, this Article briefly 
assesses strengths and weaknesses of the current regime and the principal alternatives. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions concerning tax administra-
tion in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United 
States1 and United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC2  have 
attracted considerable scholarly attention.3 Though the move in Mayo
was somewhat anticipated by an extensive prior literature,4 it is now 
clear that tax scholars and practitioners cannot escape mining the 
relatively opaque doctrines that lie at the heart of general adminis-
trative law. In Mayo, the Court rejected the idea of a tax-specific ap-
proach to judicial review.5 This clarification calls for a fresh look at a 
variety of issues of tax administration, because the IRS historically 
has operated on the assumption that tax administration is special.6
                                                                                                                  
 1. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 2. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). 
 3. See Matthew H. Friedman, Reviving National Muffler: Analyzing the Effect of 
Mayo Foundation on Judicial Deference as Applied to General Authority Tax Guidance, 107 
Nw. U. L. Rev. COLLOQUY 115 (2012); Steve R. Johnson, Mayo and the Future of Tax Regu-
lations, 130 TAX NOTES 1547, 1547 (2011) [hereinafter Johnson, Future of Tax Regula-
tions]; Steve R. Johnson, Preserving Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 
VA. TAX REV. (forthcoming 2013); Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and 
Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. L. REV. 643 (2012); Andrew Pruitt, Judicial 
Deference to Retroactive Interpretative Treasury Regulations, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1558 
(2011); Patrick J. Smith, Omissions from Gross Income and Retroactivity, 131 TAX NOTES 
57 (2011); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Professor Kristin E. Hickman in Support of Re-
spondents, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 
11-139) [hereinafter “Hickman Brief”]. 
 4. See Michael Asimow, Public Participation in the Adoption of Temporary Tax Regu-
lations, 44 TAX LAW. 343 (1991); Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to 
Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Require-
ments, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1153 (2008); Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines: 
Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemak-
ing Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727, 1740-59 (2007) [hereinafter Hickman, 
Coloring Outside the Lines]; Kristin E. Hickman, IRB Guidance: The No Man’s Land of Tax 
Code Interpretation, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 239; Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: 
Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 6 (2006).  
 5. 131 S. Ct. at 713 (“Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less 
deferential standard of review to Treasury Department regulations than we apply to the 
rules of any other agency. In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined to carve 
out an approach to administrative review good for tax law only. To the contrary, we have 
expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial re-
view of administrative action.’ ” (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999))). 
 6. See Jeremiah Coder, Tax Law’s Vanity Mirror Shattered, 134 TAX NOTES 35, 35
(2012) (“The tax world finally recognized a stark fact of life in 2011: Tax law is not special. 
It took an explicit Supreme Court statement for the tax bar to become aware of its run-of-
the-mill status, but that statement has prompted soul-searching on what litigation and 
administrative rules must be learned and followed.”). As Professor Hickman has estab-
lished in detail, the IRS often fails to give notice and comment, may not make a plain 
statement of the regulation or respond adequately to comments, has overused APA excep-
tions to notice and comment, inappropriately labeled legislative regulations as interpreta-
tive, and has often purported to cure deficiencies retroactively by undertaking notice and 
comment at final stage of regulations. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 4, 
at 1740-59 (discussing methodology and results of empirical study of Treasury regulations). 
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 A year after Mayo, the Supreme Court in Home Concrete7 had an-
other opportunity to clarify issues at the intersection of tax and ad-
ministrative law. The Court’s narrow opinion does little to squarely 
answer broader questions relating to tax administration.8 Neverthe-
less, Home Concrete does provide insight into the thinking of at least 
four Supreme Court justices on temporary Treasury regulations and 
retroactivity issues.
 Issues left open by Home Concrete include questions surrounding 
the validity and force of retroactive tax rules. For example, should 
courts apply Chevron deference9 to retroactive10 Treasury regulations 
and Auer11 deference to IRS interpretations of existing tax guidance? 
In addition, after Mayo, the uncertain application of general adminis-
trative law doctrines carries over to prospective rules enacted by the 
IRS and Treasury. Given the unusual provisions of the Internal Rev-
enue Code concerning the retroactivity of tax rules,12 a complete 
analysis of prospective tax rules must be entwined to some extent 
with an analysis of retroactive rules.  
 Prospective tax guidance provides notice and clarity to taxpayers 
planning their affairs and must anticipate a bewildering variety of 
transactions. Tax guidance takes many forms, compounding the com-
plexity of the framework for judicial review of such guidance. Inevi-
tably, however, there are gaps in the guidance. A recurring theme in 
tax administration that intersects with retroactivity issues is how to 
                                                                                                                  
 7. 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 153-65. 
 9. When Chevron deference applies, a reviewing court must uphold an agency’s rea-
sonable resolution of an ambiguity or gap in the relevant law, even if the agency’s interpre-
tation is not the best possible interpretation. See infra text accompanying notes 73-86. 
 10. Courts and commentators have struggled to define “retroactivity.” This Article’s 
use of the term relates to “primary” retroactivity, as opposed to “secondary” retroactivity, 
as explained in the following typology: 
1. Imposition of new legal standards with regard to past transactions or occurrences 
in the context of determining:  
a. the legal consequences of those past transactions or occurrences for the period up 
to the effective date of the new statute or agency rule (“primary retroactivity”); and 
b. the legal consequences of those past transactions or occurrences for the period 
beyond the effective date of the new statute or rule. Justice Scalia character-
ized this variety of retroactivity as “secondary retroactivity.” 
2. Imposition of new legal standards for transactions or occurrences after the 
effective date of the statute or rule for the purpose of determining legal  
consequences for the future (also included within Justice Scalia’s notion of  
“secondary retroactivity”). 
William V. Luneburg, Retroactivity and Administrative Rulemaking, 1991 DUKE L.J. 106, 157. 
 11. The Auer deference doctrine requires a court to defer to the agency’s interpreta-
tion of its own regulations unless plainly erroneous, even when adopted in a relatively 
informal manner, such as in a brief filed during litigation. See infra text accompanying 
notes 98-107. 
 12. See I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012). 
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deal with taxpayers who attempt to exploit the ambiguities of the tax 
law by engaging in transactions with little or no purpose beyond gen-
erating tax benefits.13 Such a taxpayer would hope to use an aggres-
sive, literalistic reading of the Code or other authorities to produce  
a deduction or generate deferral where none is intended by Con-
gress.14 There are also, of course, many situations in which taxpayers 
take aggressive interpretations of the tax law with respect to non-tax  
motivated transactions.  
 Retroactive guidance can prevent unfair windfalls that are argua-
bly permitted by gaps in prospective guidance. Obviously, another 
method of filling gaps in prospective guidance is for a court to decide 
a question. Judicial clarification of the law will generally take effect 
retroactively. However, an aggressive taxpayer would hope for a gen-
eralist court to substitute its judgment for the expert judgment of the 
IRS. If, however, it is established that retroactive Treasury regula-
tions are entitled to Chevron deference, the mere threat of such ret-
roactive regulations may deter abuse.  
 There is also a potential for overreaching by the government, and 
some observers will object to Chevron deference for retroactive 
rules.15 That approach is too skeptical, but a completely permissive 
approach to retroactivity also is unwarranted.16 Perhaps some regu-
latory tools that are appropriate to use against a tax shelter partici-
pant are not fitting for the average taxpayer,17 nor do our concerns 
for the average taxpayer equally map onto tax shelter participants. 
Although some attempts at retroactive tax administration would be 
unlawful or unconstitutional, there is flexibility for a good deal of ret-
roactive tax rulemaking. Accordingly, this Article sketches options to 
limit deference to retroactive tax rules.    
                                                                                                                  
 13. See Joshua D. Blank and Nancy Staudt, Corporate Shams, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1641, 1647 (2012) (providing a brief overview of corporate tax abuse). 
 14. See id.
 15. See Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 1251, 1253
(2011) (criticizing the tax bar’s myopia in ignoring retroactivity jurisprudence); supra
note 3, at 1578 (proposing that Congress eliminate Chevron deference for retroactive 
Treasury regulations). 
 16. See Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights, Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity,
94 GEO. L. J. 1015 (2006) (noting ambivalence of courts and scholars toward retroactivity 
despite “modern approach” embracing retroactivity). But see Michael J. Graetz, Legal 
Transitions: The Case of Retroactivity in Income Tax Revision, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 47, 49-63 
(1977) (both prospective and retroactive tax changes alter asset values and upset expecta-
tions); Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 
517-19 (1986) (generally equating economic effect of prospective and retroactive change). 
 17. Cf. Emily Cauble, Making Partnerships Work for Mom and Pop and Everyone 
Else, 2 COLUM. TAX J. 247, 250-51 (2011) (proposing simplified partnership tax regime, 
which would be “more suitable for unsophisticated partnerships and make the law  
less prone to exploitation by sophisticated partnerships,” noting that “undue focus on the  
needs of unsophisticated partnerships leads to rules that are ripe for manipulation by  
sophisticated taxpayers”).  
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 Part II describes certain general administrative law requirements 
governing agency action and the principles of judicial review of agen-
cy action. Part III discusses the implications of these fundamental 
principles for tax rules (including regulations, temporary regulations, 
and revenue rulings). The analysis takes into account the Code’s un-
usual grant of retroactive rulemaking power to the Treasury De-
partment. Part III concludes that final Treasury regulations should 
ordinarily receive Chevron deference; temporary Treasury regula-
tions and revenue rulings should be reviewed under the less deferen-
tial Skidmore standard. The conclusion remains the same whether or 
not the rule is retroactive. Part IV anticipates potential constitution-
al challenges to retroactivity, observing that the Constitution affords 
agencies, including the IRS, substantial flexibility to make policy ret-
roactively. Part V sketches a tentative appraisal of the current state 
of affairs as well as the principal alternatives. 
II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AGENCY ACTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
 This Part summarizes certain fundamental principles governing 
agency action and judicial review of agency action. This broader ad-
ministrative law context is key to examining the implications of Mayo’s 
mandate to apply uniform principles of judicial review of agency action 
to tax administration.   
A.   Modalities of Administrative Action and  
Procedural Requirements 
 Under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), agency action is 
generally quite flexible.18 The modalities of agency action include 
rulemaking and adjudication.19 Rulemaking includes formulating in-
terpretations of general applicability and future effect implementing, 
prescribing, or interpreting law or policy.20 Adjudication includes tri-
al-like determinations as well as a variety of actions that are not tri-
al-like; the residual category of agency action that is not rulemaking  
is adjudication.21
1.   Procedures 
 Rulemaking and adjudication may be conducted informally, unless 
a hearing on the record is specifically required by statute.22 Where a 
                                                                                                                  
 18. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-596 (2006). 
 19. 5 U.S.C. § 551(5), (7) (2006). 
 20. Id. § 551(4)-(5). 
 21. Id. § 551(6)-(7). 
 22. Id. §§ 553(c) (rulemaking), 554(a) (adjudication), 555 (ancillary matters); Florida 
E. Coast Ry. Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 224, 237 (1973) (noting that a “hearing” re-
quirement, without more, does not trigger formal procedures); Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. 
EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We will henceforth make no presumption that 
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statute requires a hearing on the record, the APA imposes a variety 
of trial-type procedures on the agency, such as fact finding by an in-
dependent administrative law judge (or the head of the agency itself), 
a ban on ex parte contacts, and a requirement that facts must be ad-
duced exclusively from the record established in the hearing.23
 Rules further divide into two principal categories: interpretative 
rules and legislative rules. Legislative rules must be promulgated 
through procedures allowing for prior notice and comment by the 
public, while interpretative rules as well as general statements of 
policy need not undergo notice and comment.24
 The distinction between legislative rules and interpretative rules 
has always been fuzzy.25 This Article’s working definition is that both 
types of rules bind the agency and the public, but interpretative rules 
could fairly be described as construing the relevant statutory text or pre-
existing agency guidance, rather than setting forth a new rule that 
could not fairly be deduced from the statute or pre-existing guidance.26
 This working definition appears to be the modern trend in cases 
and general administrative law scholarship.27 Professor Hickman, 
however, appears to reject this distinction as unconvincing “rhetoric”28
                                                                                                                  
a statutory ‘hearing’ requirement does or does not compel the agency to undertake a formal 
‘hearing on the record,’ thereby leaving it to the agency, as an initial matter, to resolve the 
ambiguity.”). But see Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1977) (“In 
summary, the crucial question is not whether particular talismanic language was used but 
whether the proceedings under review fall within that category of quasi-judicial proceed-
ings deserving of special procedural protections.”). 
 23. Id. §§ 556-557. 
 24. Id. § 553(b). 
 25. Robert A. Anthony, “Interpretive” Rules, “Legislative” Rules and “Spurious” Rules: 
Lifting the Smog, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1 (1994) (noting “ineradicable confusion” in the area 
of legislative versus non-legislative rules); Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking 
and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J. 381, 382 (“The nonlegislative rule exemptions in 
the federal APA have proved difficult to apply in practice and have been the subject of con-
stant litigation.”); Morgan Douglas Mitchell, Note, Wolf or Sheep?: Is an Agency Pro-
nouncement a Legislative Rule, Interpretive Rule, or Policy Statement?, 62 ALA. L. REV. 839 
(2011) (surveying cases). 
 26. See Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73 (1st Cir. 1998); Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165 
(7th Cir. 1996); Anthony, supra note 25, at 12-14. Cf. Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Health & 
Safety Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (articulating a four-part test, an im-
portant factor of which is “whether in the absence of the rule there would not be an ade-
quate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency action to confer benefits or 
ensure the performance of duties”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules 
from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547 (2000) (approving of American Mining fac-
tors). But see Mada-Luna v. Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir. 1987) (testing for binding 
effect on the agency).  
 27. See JEFFREY S. LUBBERS, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 73-74 (5th 
ed. 2012) (“More recent decisions have taken the more literal view . . . that the test for in-
voking the interpretive rule exemption is whether the pronouncement really interprets 
existing legislation (or a pre-existing legislative rule).”). 
 28. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 4, at 1770 (“Some who defend 
the interpretative label . . . turn to rhetoric often employed by the courts that legislative rules 
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and would instead put controlling weight on whether a rule is bind-
ing on the agency and the public.29 Professor Manning, however, ex-
plains that if “an agency wishes to promulgate a more binding di-
rective, it may use an ‘interpretative rule.’ ”30 Moreover, Manning clas-
sifies the policymaking-versus-interpretation distinction as fundamen-
tally a “question of degree.”31
2.   Choice of Modality 
 These APA categories sketch a general administrative law skele-
ton, while various organic enactments specify the role, powers, and 
limitations of the various executive agencies.32 Congress often allows 
an agency to use all the basic modalities (i.e., rulemaking or adjudi-
cation, of either formal or informal cast) to enforce the law and make 
policy.33 On the other hand, an act may instead require a specific mo-
dality for certain kinds of agency action, mandate hybrid procedures, 
or disallow certain modalities entirely.34
 Under longstanding precedent, courts have allowed agencies to 
choose freely the modality (rulemaking or adjudication) through 
which to make policy where consistent with the relevant organic 
act.35 Procedural play in the joints is extremely helpful, if not abso-
lutely necessary, in the administration of complex laws. This flexibility 
has another side, however. In some sense, executive agencies are ef-
fectively exercising executive, quasi-legislative, and quasi-judicial 
powers.36 This concentration of power in one body is in tension  
with separation of powers values. The Supreme Court, however, has 
allowed the concentration of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial  
powers in an agency.37 This may be due to judicially unmanageable  
line-drawing issues.38
                                                                                                                  
‘create new law, rights or duties,’ while interpretative rules merely state ‘what the agency 
thinks the statute means.’ ”). 
 29. Id. at 1771. 
 30. See Manning, infra note 38, at 916.  
 31. Id. (comparing to the nondelegation and rulemaking-versus-adjudication inquiries). 
 32. Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regula-
tory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for 
the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 506-15 (1995) (classifying 
statutory limitations on agency discretion, e.g., purposive limits, subject-matter limits, proce-
dural prerequisites and limits, limits on standard setting, and limits on regulatory method). 
 33. See LUBBERS, supra note 27, at 4-6. 
 34. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Es-
say on Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185, 205 
(1994) (finding that Congress sometimes requires rulemaking in hopes of avoiding agency 
capture); Alan B. Morrison, The Administrative Procedure Act: A Living and Responsive 
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 253, 256 (1986) (noting a modern trend toward rulemaking). 
 35. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 209 (1947). 
 36. See Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 32, at 539-42 (summarizing how separation of 
powers theory has shaped the structure of administrative law). 
 37. In Withrow v. Larkin, the Court explained:  
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 Delegation of “breathtakingly broad” quasi-legislative power to an 
agency is common in organic acts.39 This has not always been uncon-
troversial. As Professor Manning writes, “proponents of a strong 
nondelegation doctrine maintain that important legislative policies 
should have to survive the more democratic, deliberation-enhancing 
process of bicameralism and presentment prescribed by Article I, 
Section 7.”40 Indeed, in the early days of the administrative state, the 
Court invalidated statutes on the ground that Congress impermissi-
bly delegated legislative authority to an executive agency.41 Later de-
cisions have, however, made clear that Congress may delegate to 
agencies the power to make policy so long as there is an “intelligible 
principle” limiting the delegation.42
 Moreover, many agencies may also exercise broad adjudicatory 
powers consistent with their organic act. An agency adjudication  
may involve finding facts, applying existing rules, and formulating 
new policies. Such powers are a standard feature of modern agencies  
                                                                                                                  
  The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative func-
tions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative  
adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must 
overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudica-
tors; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological 
tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative 
powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudg-
ment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to 
be adequately implemented. 
421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975); see also FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 701 (1948) (observing 
that “the fact that the Commission had entertained such views as the result of its prior ex 
parte investigations did not necessarily mean that the minds of its members were irrevoca-
bly closed on the subject of the respondents’ basing point practices”); Wilkins & Hunt,  
supra note 32, at 541-42 (“The nondelegation doctrine by itself is of limited significance,  
as are the principal vestiges of the strict separation-of-powers view remaining in our  
administrative jurisprudence.”). 
 38. See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 894-95 
(2004) (“Lacking any judicially manageable standards to determine how much conferred 
discretion is too much, the Court essentially leaves it to Congress to determine how pre-
cise or vague its organic acts should be. Second, similar considerations emerge (though 
less explicitly) from the Court’s cases governing an agency’s choice between rulemaking  
and adjudication.”). 
 39. See Manning, supra note 38, at 897; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. 
Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 866 (2001). 
 40. Manning, supra note 38, at 897. 
 41. See Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 42. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474-75 (2001) (“In the 
history of the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two 
statutes, one of which provided literally no guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the 
other of which conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more 
precise a standard than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’ . . . In 
short, we have ‘almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the permis-
sible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.’ ”) 
(citations omitted). 
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despite potential objections concerning separation of powers, proce-
dural due process, and retroactivity.43
3.   Retroactivity Issues 
 The drawbacks of this latter potential feature of adjudication—the 
agency’s formulation of a new rule simultaneously applied to a party 
that has already undertaken conduct burdened by the new rule—is 
an old theme in administrative law. In theory, agencies could be re-
quired to announce new policies only prospectively, but the Supreme 
Court has never suggested that such a requirement exists.  
 In the classic Chenery II case, the Court considered whether the 
SEC could adopt a new policy through adjudication or whether the pol-
icy could only be adopted through rulemaking.44 The Court acknowl-
edged that all other things being equal, rulemaking would be prefer-
able; the choice, however, was left with agencies: 
[A]ny rigid requirement to that effect would make the administra-
tive process inflexible and incapable of dealing with many of the 
specialized problems which arise. Not every principle essential to 
the effective administration of a statute can or should be cast im-
mediately into the mold of a general rule. Some principles must 
await their own development, while others must be adjusted to meet 
particular, unforeseeable situations. In performing its important 
functions in these respects, therefore, an administrative agency 
must be equipped to act either by general rule or by individual or-
der. To insist upon one form of action to the exclusion of the other 
is to exalt form over necessity.45
Thus, Chenery II clearly chose agency flexibility over a general norm  
against retroactivity.46
                                                                                                                  
 43. See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 680 (1996) (arguing that the Su-
preme Court’s deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own guidance “has inverted a 
basic feature of our constitutional structure by presuming that Congress’s delegation of 
lawmaking power to agencies intrinsically includes a delegation of agency power to say 
what its own ‘laws’ (i.e., regulations) mean.”); Wilkins & Hunt, supra note 32, at 540 
(“[T]here is a strong sense in traditional administrative theory that where the same body 
has simultaneous executive, legislative, and judicial power over the same subject matter, 
or where a non-legislative body gains substantial policymaking power, it creates serious 
unaccountability or even tyranny.”); see also Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative 
Law as Constitutional Common Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 488-89 (2010) (“Although the 
Court has rejected the claim that combining investigative and adjudicatory functions neces-
sarily violates due process, it has also acknowledged the possibility that such a combination 
may undermine an individual’s due process right to an unbiased decision-maker.”). 
 44. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947). In Chenery I, the Court had remanded 
the matter to the SEC, refusing to uphold the SEC’s order on grounds that the agency did 
not actually rely upon in reaching its conclusion.  Id. at 196. The SEC then reexamined the 
matter, reaching the same conclusion on different grounds. Id.
 45. Id. at 202 (citation omitted). 
 46. See id.
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 Retroactivity more typically arises from agency adjudications or 
enforcement decisions, but retroactive rulemaking is another possi-
bility.47 Although an agency’s authority to adjudicate can be inferred 
from a broad delegation of responsibility to an agency, retroactive 
rulemaking authority must be expressly authorized.48 Thus, agen-
cies one way or another will often have occasion to make policy 
retroactively, and may be able to do so through adjudication or  
rulemaking—or simply by deciding what circumstances merit  
enforcement of an unclear provision.  
 It is unclear whether retroactivity should present an additional 
administrative law hurdle or only a potential constitutional claim.49
Courts have certainly found retroactive application of new rules to be 
an abuse of discretion by the agency. For example, the D.C. Circuit in 
Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB denied retroactive 
enforcement of an order of reinstatement and back pay based on the  
following factors:  
(1) whether the particular case is one of first impression, (2) whether 
the new rule represents an abrupt departure from well established 
practice or merely attempts to fill a void in an unsettled area of 
law, (3) the extent to which the party against whom the new rule 
is applied relied on the former rule, (4) the degree of the burden 
which a retroactive order imposes on a party, and (5) the statutory 
interest in applying a new rule despite the reliance of a party on 
the old standard.50
 The Supreme Court’s signals have been mixed, but this multi-
factor approach to retroactivity in agency adjudication seems out of 
step with the Court’s latest pronouncements on the issue. In Bell 
Aerospace, the Court permitted the NLRB to determine through  
adjudication—contrary to the Board’s prior decisions—that buyers 
constituted a collective bargaining unit and direct a representation 
election.51 However, the Court in dictum observed that retroactivity 
could be precluded in a case where a party suffers “substantial” harm 
for actions taken in “good-faith reliance on Board pronouncements.”52
On the other hand, in Vermont Yankee, the Supreme Court held that 
                                                                                                                  
 47. Indeed, tax rules were initially retroactive by default. See Mitchell Rogovin & 
Donald L. Korb, The Four R’s Revisited: Regulations, Rulings, Reliance and Retroactivity in 
the 21st Century—A View from Within, 87 TAXES 21, 23 (2009). 
 48. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
 49. See infra Part IV for a discussion of constitutional issues raised by retroactive 
tax guidance. 
 50. Retail, Wholesale, and Dep’t Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 51. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 291-92 (1974).  
 52. Id. at 295; see also Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs., 467 U.S. 51, 60 n.12 (1984) 
(refusing to adopt a “flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances run against the 
Government” and noting that this “principle also underlies the doctrine that an adminis-
trative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would unduly intrude 
upon reasonable reliance interests.”). 
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courts may not require agencies to follow additional procedures beyond 
what Congress has required in the APA and the organic act.53 Moreo-
ver, the Court’s first decision in FCC v. Fox54 indicates clearly that 
courts should not subject administrative action to higher scrutiny than 
the APA requires in order to avoid reaching constitutional issues.55
 Fox I involved the FCC’s departure from a past policy of leniency 
with regard to fleeting expletives in broadcasts.56 Among other inci-
dents of indecency at issue, Fox broadcast the 2003 Billboard Music 
Awards, in which Nicole Ritchie made indecent remarks.57 The FCC 
announced a new policy in adjudication that even fleeting expletives 
would not be tolerated. The Court held that “the Commission’s new 
enforcement policy and its order finding the broadcasts actionably 
indecent were neither arbitrary nor capricious. . . .”58 The Court 
found “no basis in the Administrative Procedure Act or in our opin-
ions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more 
searching review.”59
 The Court remanded the case for further consideration of First 
Amendment issues.60 But the Court clearly indicated that the  
“arbitrary and capricious” standard should not be transformed, even 
in light of potential First Amendment concerns. “If [broadcasters] 
mean to invite us to apply a more stringent arbitrary-and-capricious 
review to agency actions that implicate constitutional liberties, we 
reject the invitation.”61
 When the case reached the Supreme Court again, the Court inval-
idated the Commission’s standard on vagueness grounds without 
reaching the First Amendment issues.62 As the Court explained, “A 
fundamental principle in our legal system is that laws . . . must give 
fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or required.”63 Vagueness, ac-
cordingly, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
when “conviction or punishment” is obtained under a “statute or reg-
ulation” that “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair 
notice of what is prohibited, or is so standardless that it authorizes or 
                                                                                                                  
 53. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
523-24, 543-44 (1978) (refusing to require additional procedures for informal rulemaking 
beyond those specified in the APA). 
 54. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I), 556 U.S. 502 (2009). 
 55. See Metzger, supra note 43, at 483 (noting that “the Court expressly refused to 
link ordinary administrative law to constitutional concerns”).  
 56. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 510. 
 57. In the words of Nicole Ritchie, “Have you ever tried to get cow s*** out of a Prada 
purse? It’s not so f***ing simple.” Id.
 58. Id. at 517. 
 59. Id. at 514. 
 60. Id. at 530.  
 61. Id. at 516. 
 62. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2320 (2012).  
 63. Id. at 2317. 
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encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”64 This standard 
would, however, appear to leave leeway for agency changes of posi-
tion if there is no “punishment,” or if change is more in the nature of 
clarification or otherwise foreseeable. 
4.   Arbitrary and Capricious Limitation 
 The arbitrary and capricious standard65 is a general limitation on 
all agency action, but it is “narrow.”66 As the Court explains in Fox I,
the arbitrary and capricious standard is not a license for the court to 
substitute judgment for an agency’s weighing of various factors.67
It is, instead, a requirement that an agency consider relevant factors 
and arrive at a conclusion in a reasonable manner. An agency’s 
failure to consider relevant facts would lead to a finding of arbi-
trary and capriciousness, but a reasonable—even if not the most 
desirable—conclusion is not arbitrary and capricious.68 To be sure, 
arbitrary and capricious review of agency action is less deferential 
than the rationality review that courts apply when considering due 
process challenges to economic legislation. Courts will not supply 
reasons that the agency did not actually rely upon in making its deci-
sion, and the level of scrutiny more generally has evolved to what 
scholars call “hard look.”69 Nevertheless, the arbitrary and capricious 
standard of review remains an extremely deferential one. 
 The arbitrary and capricious standard serves as a useful transi-
tion from the present discussion of general principles of agency action 
under the APA to the following discussion of principles of judicial re-
view of agency action. The arbitrary and capricious standard lies  
between the primarily procedural APA requirements and the primar-
ily substantive judicial review doctrines. The standard is primarily 
                                                                                                                  
 64. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008)). 
 65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006).  
 66. Fox I, 556 U.S. at 513. (“Under what we have called this ‘narrow’ standard of re-
view, we insist that an agency ‘examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory 
explanation for its action.’ ”) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).  
 67. Id. at 513-14 (“We have made clear, however, that ‘a court is not to substitute its 
judgment for that of the agency,’ and should ‘uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if 
the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.’ ”) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Ar-
kansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
 68. Id. at 515-16 (“Sometimes it must—when, for example, its new policy rests upon 
factual findings that contradict those which underlay its prior policy; or when its prior 
policy has engendered serious reliance interests that must be taken into account. It would 
be arbitrary or capricious to ignore such matters. In such cases it is not that further justifi-
cation is demanded by the mere fact of policy change; but that a reasoned explanation is 
needed for disregarding facts and circumstances that underlay or were engendered by the 
prior policy.” (citations omitted)); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of United States, Inc. v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (providing the standard definition of 
what the arbitrary and capricious standard of review requires of an agency). 
 69. See Metzger, supra note 43, at 490-94 (summarizing “hard look” review). 
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process-oriented (did the agency consider relevant factors?) but also 
incorporates narrow substantive elements (was the consideration 
reasonable?). Moreover, the arbitrary and capricious standard reap-
pears as part of Chevron deference. Nevertheless, it may be useful to 
think of the arbitrary and capricious standard as a limitation on va-
lidity of agency action ab initio; if an agency action is arbitrary and 
capricious, it is invalid under the APA. Nevertheless, even if an 
agency action is valid under the APA, depending on the applicable 
deference regime, a court may reject the agency’s position.      
B.   Judicial Review of Agency Action 
 If an agency has acted validly under the APA, the next question is 
whether a court will accept or reject the agency’s interpretation. 
Congress regularly delegates authority to executive agencies either 
explicitly or by enacting ambiguous laws. Courts have typically af-
forded some degree of deference to the positions of an agency charged 
with implementing the relevant statute. This deference regime to 
some extent respects separation of powers and comparative institu-
tional advantage at policymaking.70 There is a continuum of judicial 
deference to agency action. Some types of agency interpretations  
will be entitled to little or no deference, while other types of agency 
interpretations merit near absolute deference. 
1.   Scope of Chevron and Skidmore Deference 
 Skidmore deference lies toward the weak end of the deference con-
tinuum.71 In Skidmore, the Supreme Court held that the position of 
an agency is entitled to deference to the extent the position is persua-
sive, taking into account such factors as “the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it 
power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”72 The weight of these 
factors for or against an agency is highly dependent on the context 
surrounding an agency’s adoption of a position. Thus, Skidmore def-
erence is on a “sliding scale” and could be quite strong. 
 While Skidmore establishes the baseline for judicial deference to 
agency interpretations, certain types of agency interpretations  
merit stronger deference. In Chevron,73 the Court set forth74 a more 
                                                                                                                  
 70. See generally NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS 
IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 124-25, 139-49 (1994) (comparing advantages of 
agencies versus courts); cf. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 39, at 865-66 (discussing the 
idea that deference is a second-best solution to the nondelegation doctrine). 
 71. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 72. Id. at 140. 
 73. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  
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deferential two-step framework, the precise scope of which remains 
unclear almost three decades later.75 Under Chevron, a reviewing 
court must first consider whether Congress has “directly addressed the 
precise question at issue.”76 If the statute does not directly address the 
precise question, then at step two the court defers to an agency’s inter-
pretation unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to  
the statute.”77
 When Chevron deference applies, the court’s review virtually col-
lapses into arbitrary and capricious review.78 Arbitrary and capri-
cious review generally interrogates whether an agency has engaged 
in reasoned consideration of the factors relevant to the matter at 
hand. The agency must always consider what the relevant statute 
provides; an interpretation that is contrary to the statute would not 
be a reasonable one. Thus, although the Court’s doctrine as well as 
the APA79 separately state inconsistency with the statute as grounds 
for invalidation of agency action, an agency position manifestly con-
trary to the statute should be analytically merged into the concept of 
arbitrary and capricious. 
 The scope of Chevron deference remains unclear.80 As the Court 
explained in Mead, Chevron deference applies when “Congress dele-
gated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the 
force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference 
was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.”81 Moreover, the 
delegation to the agency may be express or implied. As the Court ex-
plained, even in the absence of an express delegation to implement a 
particular provision, “it can still be apparent from the agency’s gen-
erally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances that 
Congress would expect the agency to be able to speak with the force 
of law when it addresses ambiguity in the statute or fills a space in 
the enacted law . . . .”82
 The Court appears to have supplied a Chevron safe harbor to agency 
action undertaken in the form of notice and comment rulemaking as 
                                                                                                                  
 74. This may overstate the Court’s move; some would say that the Court to some ex-
tent clarified a pre-existing deference regime and expanded it to additional types of agency 
action. See Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore 
Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1241-42 (2007). 
 75. See infra text accompanying notes 80-93. 
 76. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43. 
 77. Id. at 844.  
 78. See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating “analysis would be 
the same” under Chevron step two and APA arbitrary and capricious review).  
 79. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(C) (2006) (reviewing court shall set agency action “in excess 
of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right”). 
 80. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 74, at 1246-48. 
 81. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226-27 (2001). 
 82. Id. at 229. 
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well as formal adjudication.83 But, the Court has never adopted a 
bright-line rule that Chevron deference only applies to notice and 
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication. Although the Court’s 
repeated praise for those modalities is difficult to dismiss, it is just as 
difficult to dismiss the Court’s explicit disavowal of a bright-line rule.84
Indeed, the Court has deferred to other types of agency action.85
 The central thesis of Mead is that Chevron deference respects a 
legislative intent to delegate primary interpretive power to an execu-
tive agency rather than the courts.86 Accordingly, it would seem that 
notice and comment rulemaking and formal adjudication may really 
just be shortcuts for finding a delegation of gap-filling authority. In 
Barnhart v. Walton, the Court specified other factors that tend to 
show delegation deserving of Chevron deference: “the interstitial na-
ture of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the 
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the com-
plexity of that administration, and the careful consideration the 
Agency has given the question over a long period of time . . . .”87
 Professor Lisa Schultz Bressman’s examination of Mead and 
Barnhart as applied by the lower federal courts reveals that  
some courts concentrate on whether an interpretation binds more 
than the parties at hand; some broaden this analysis to ask wheth-
er, in addition to binding effect, the interpretation reflects public 
participation; some limit their focus to whether an agency interpre-
tation reflects careful consideration; and some expand this focus, 
weighing careful consideration along with agency expertise and 
statutory complexity.88
Bressman persuasively argues that these readings are only “half 
right”; the analysis should partake of both binding effect (the promise 
of consistency underlying Mead) and careful consideration (factors 
stressed in Barnhart).89 Crisply stated, “we should restrict Chevron
                                                                                                                  
 83. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230-31. 
 84. See id. (“[A]s significant as notice-and-comment is in pointing to Chevron authority, 
the want of that procedure here does not decide the case, for we have sometimes found 
reasons for Chevron deference even when no such administrative formality was required 
and none was afforded.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). 
 85. See NationsBank of N.C. N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251, 251 
(1995) (Comptroller of Currency’s informal determination granted Chevron deference); see 
also Merrill & Hickman, supra note 39, at 884 (“However, the Court has not explained in 
any of these decisions why, consistent with the underlying logic of delegation, an agency 
should be entitled to mandatory deference when it interprets a statute in a procedural 
format that does not otherwise have the force of law.”); id. at n.250 (citing additional cases).  
 86. See Mead, 533 U.S. at 230. 
 87. See 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002).  
 88. See Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency 
Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1459 (2005). 
 89. Id. at 1488. 
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deference to procedures or interpretations that reflect transparency, 
rationality, and consistency.”90
 Binding agency authority will often emerge through notice and 
comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, but not necessarily. For 
example, an APA exception for “good cause” allows an agency to de-
lay notice and comment otherwise required for the promulgation of 
legislative rules.91 In addition, a rule that binds the agency and the 
public might be interpretative and therefore not necessitate notice 
and comment.92 Such an interpretative rule might, depending on the 
agency’s procedures, undergo substantial consideration at the agency 
that fosters “fairness and deliberation” even if not notice and com-
ment under the APA.93
2.   Changes in an Agency’s Position  
 A related line of cases concern the implications for judicial defer-
ence to changes in an agency’s position—from an agency or a court’s 
prior interpretation of a statute. It is irrelevant to Chevron’s scope 
whether an agency’s position has changed over time.94 Moreover, an 
agency’s interpretation is entitled to deference even if it is contrary to 
a prior decision of a court so long as the relevant statute is ambigu-
ous as to the precise question at issue.95 If the court has held that the 
statute is unambiguous, then the agency has no power to change the 
interpretation. It is an open question whether even a Supreme Court 
decision can be reversed by a new agency interpretation.96 Taken to-
gether, these rules prevent “ossification” of initial decisions by an 
                                                                                                                  
 90. Id. at 1492. 
 91. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(d)(3) (2006). 
 92. See sources cited supra note 26 (discussing difficulty of distinguishing interpretative 
rules from legislative rules). 
 93. Cf. Mead, 533 U.S. at 232-34 (finding that classification rulings were somewhat 
precedential, but subject to further agency review, did not apply to the public, and were 
being “churned out” at the rate of 10,000 per year); Krzalic v. Republic Tile Co., 314 F.3d 
875, 881-82 (7th Cir. 2002) (distinguishing a “perfunctory” HUD policy statement from an 
earlier HUD policy statement that was the product of “meeting with government repre-
sentatives plus a broad range of consumer and industry groups”). 
 94. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 712-13 
(2011) (“[W]e have found it immaterial to our analysis that a ‘regulation was prompted by 
litigation.’ Indeed, in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 
(2001), we expressly invited the Treasury Department to ‘amend its regulations’ if troubled 
by the consequences of our resolution of the case.” (citations omitted) (quoting Smiley v. 
Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740 (1996).  
 95. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 
(“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise  
entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows 
from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”). 
 96. See infra text accompanying notes 153-61 (explaining why Home Concrete has not 
changed this understanding of Brand X).
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agency or a court, and allow agencies the flexibility to adapt policy 
over time without seeking statutory change.97
3.   Deference to an Agency’s Interpretation of its Own Guidance 
 Courts also defer to an agency’s interpretation of the agency’s pri-
or guidance that is offered in the course of litigation, unless the in-
terpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent.”98 In Auer, the 
Court deferred to the Secretary of Labor’s interpretation presented in 
an amicus brief.99 The Court held that adoption of the interpretation 
in a brief did not, “in the circumstances of this case, make it unwor-
thy of deference.”100 The Court noted that “[t]he Secretary’s position 
is in no sense a ‘post hoc rationalizatio[n]’ advanced by an agency 
seeking to defend past agency action against attack.”101 As the Court 
explained, “There is simply no reason to suspect that the interpreta-
tion does not reflect the agency’s fair and considered judgment on the 
matter in question.”102
 Auer deference has been criticized for allowing self-delegation by 
agencies and creating improper incentives against careful rulemak-
ing. For example, Professor Manning argues that Auer deference al-
lows agencies to substitute statutory ambiguity with regulatory am-
biguity and conflates lawmaking with law exposition.103 Moreover, 
Justice Scalia also appears to have embraced that critique: 
When Congress enacts an imprecise statute that it commits to the 
implementation of an executive agency, it has no control over that 
implementation (except, of course, through further, more precise, 
legislation). The legislative and executive functions are not com-
bined. But when an agency promulgates an imprecise rule, it 
leaves to itself the implementation of that rule, and thus the initial 
determination of the rule’s meaning.104
The agency’s interpretation may not undergo any formal process or 
be open to comment from the public.105 Thus, these interpretations 
                                                                                                                  
 97. See Michael C. Harper, Judicial Control of the National Labor Relations Board’s 
Lawmaking in the Age of Chevron and Brand X, 89 B.U. L. REV. 189, 206 (2009); Thomas O. 
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” The Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385 (1992). 
 98. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley 
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)). 
 99. Id. at 461-62. 
 100. Id. at 462. 
 101. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 212 (1988)). 
 102. Id.
 103. See Manning, supra note 43, at 654-74. 
 104. See Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 131 S. Ct. 2254, 2266 (2011) (Scalia, 
J., concurring). 
 105. Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s Domain, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1449, 1483-84 (2011) (discussing the “wide variety of forms” in which agen-
cies have adopted interpretations of prior interpretations of a statute). 
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may avoid the “pay me now or pay me later” principle;106 they also 
raise retroactivity issues.  
 Nevertheless, Auer deference has been affirmed many times, in-
cluding in recent Supreme Court opinions.107 Perhaps this should 
come as no surprise, given the Court’s refusal to limit Chevron defer-
ence to relatively formal agency guidance. If nonlegislative rules and 
informal adjudications may sometimes receive Chevron deference,108
then the avoidance of the “pay me now or pay me later” principle is a 
much larger phenomenon.  
III.   APPLICATION OF GENERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES TO 
TAX RULES
 This Part integrates the general administrative law principles 
previously discussed into the specific context of tax administration, 
especially retroactive or litigation oriented guidance. The Supreme 
Court recently had occasion in Mayo109 and Home Concrete110 to clarify 
several issues of tax administration. In Mayo, the Court signaled an 
end to tax exceptionalism in administrative law, absent special justifi-
cations.111 Home Concrete, as will be explained, was narrowly decided 
and left unanswered many of the important questions presented.  
 The discussion proceeds by type of guidance, including final regu-
lations, temporary regulations, revenue rulings, and position state-
ments in briefs filed during litigation. I assume that general state-
ments of policy and other non-binding guidance, such as private let-
ter rulings, technical advice memoranda, and the like are not eligible 
for any deference. 
A.   Final Regulations 
 Pre-Mayo, it was unclear whether Chevron or the tax-specific Na-
tional Muffler precedent applied to judicial review of Treasury regu-
lations.112 National Muffler, unlike Chevron and essentially like 
Skidmore,113 applied a sliding scale of deference based in part on the 
                                                                                                                  
 106. Id. at 1464 (“This ‘pay me now or pay me later’ principle has gradually emerged as 
a crucial feature of the doctrine, one that allows courts to avoid direct regulation of agency 
choice of policymaking form while retaining some form of meaningful check—either ex ante 
procedural safeguards or ex post judicial scrutiny—on administrative decisions.”).   
 107. See, e.g., Talk Am., 131 S. Ct. at 2261 (2011); Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 
131 S. Ct. 871, 880 (2011). However, the Auer precedent has recently shown signs of weaken-
ing. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 132 S. Ct. 2156, 2166-67 (2012) (holding 
Auer does not apply when there is unfair surprise from the agency reversing its position). 
 108. See supra text accompanying notes 80-93. 
 109. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 110. United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012). 
 111. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
 112. Id. at 712. 
 113. See supra text accompanying notes 71-79. 
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consistency of an agency’s interpretation over time and whether it 
was adopted in response to litigation.114 Therefore, retroactive or liti-
gation-prompted tax rules would have fared comparatively poorly 
under the standard articulated in National Muffler.115 Mayo, in con-
trast, disavows tax exceptionalism and holds that Chevron deference 
applies to notice and comment Treasury regulations.116
 In addition, the IRS has historically claimed that many of its rules 
are interpretative; however, Mayo rejects the general authority-
specific authority distinction that the IRS typically has cited in 
promulgating regulations.117 After Mayo, it is clear that notice and 
comment final regulations should receive Chevron deference. Mayo
does not, however, hold that all regulations are legislative rules. The 
leading test, though a question of degree and subject to much valid 
criticism, is whether the authority really interprets an existing stat-
ute or guidance, or whether instead the agency’s position cannot fol-
low from a process of interpretation.118
Mayo does not reject that test; it does indicate that general au-
thority versus specific authority is not the correct inquiry under 
Chevron.119 Professor Lubbers writes that it is entirely consistent 
with Mead for an interpretative rule to be bootstrapped into Chevron 
eligibility when the agency voluntarily uses procedures that Congress 
would intend to generate deference.120 As a unanimous Supreme 
Court explained in Long Island Care at Home, when a rule  
sets forth important individual rights and duties, where the agen-
cy focuses fully and directly upon the issue, where the agency uses 
                                                                                                                  
 114. See Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472, 477 (1979) 
(“In determining whether a particular regulation carries out the congressional mandate in 
a proper manner, we look to see whether the regulation harmonizes with the plain lan-
guage of the statute, its origin, and its purpose. A regulation may have particular force if it 
is a substantially contemporaneous construction of the statute by those presumed to have 
been aware of congressional intent. If the regulation dates from a later period, the manner 
in which it evolved merits inquiry. Other relevant considerations are the length of time the 
regulation has been in effect, the reliance placed on it, the consistency of the Commission-
er’s interpretation, and the degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to the regulation dur-
ing subsequent re-enactments of the statute.”); see also Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. United 
States, 142 F.3d 973, 983 (7th Cir. 1998) (explaining that National Muffler was less deferential 
than Chevron). 
 115. But see Johnson, Future of Tax Regulations, supra note 3, at 1552 (arguing  
that the application of these factors could only increase, not decrease, deference to the  
government’s interpretation). 
 116. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 712-13 (“[W]e have found it immaterial to our analysis that a 
‘regulation was prompted by litigation.’ Indeed, in United Dominion Industries, Inc. v. 
United States, 532 U.S. 822, 838 (2001), we expressly invited the Treasury Department  
to ‘amend its regulations’ if troubled by the consequences of our resolution of the case.”  
(citation omitted)). 
 117. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 27-31. 
 119. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713. 
 120. See LUBBERS, supra note 27, at 467. 
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full notice-and-comment procedures to promulgate a rule . . . and 
where the rule itself is reasonable, then a court ordinarily assumes 
that Congress intended it to defer to the agency’s determination.121
Thus, the Court reversed the Second Circuit’s holding that a rule was 
interpretative and therefore ineligible for Chevron deference.122 It is 
not entirely clear, however, whether the Court agreed with the Se-
cond Circuit that the rule was interpretative.    
 Mayo clearly approves of agency changes in position over time, 
even when prompted by litigation, but what about the problem, not 
presented in Mayo, of retroactivity? What if, for example, the regula-
tions defining “student” status had been made effective beginning 
two years prior to the promulgation of the rule? 
 At a glance, Section 7805(b)(1) appears to establish a general rule 
against  regulations taking effect before the public has notice of the 
expected contents of the rules the regulations will contain.123 The cur-
rent version of Section 7805(b), however, only applies to “regulations 
which relate to statutory provisions enacted on or after [July 30, 
1996,] the date of enactment of this Act.”124 Prior to amendment, Sec-
tion 7805(b) expressly allowed the Treasury to “prescribe the extent, 
if any, to which any ruling or regulation, relating to the internal rev-
enue laws, shall be applied without retroactive effect.”125 Although 
the effective date clause’s meaning is contested,126 the IRS’s position 
is that this permissive standard applies to regulations relating to 
much of the Code.127 Moreover, even in the case of regulations relating 
to post-1996 Code sections, regulations may take effect retroactively to  
“prevent abuse.”128
 There is a circuit split as to whether an agency’s interpretation of 
jurisdictional rules receives deference.129 Thus, it is an open question 
whether the IRS and Treasury’s decision to apply regulations retro-
                                                                                                                  
 121. Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007). 
 122. Id. at 172. 
 123. In general, tax regulations may not take effect before the earlier of: the date on 
which such regulation is filed with the Federal Register; the date on which any proposed or 
temporary regulation to which such final regulation relates was filed with the Federal 
Register; or the date on which any notice substantially describing the expected contents of 
any temporary, proposed, or final regulation is issued to the public. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (2012). 
 124. Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(b), 110 Stat. 1468 (1996).  
 125. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (1994). 
 126. See Lederman, supra note 3, at 674 n.179 (noting ambiguity as to whether the 
date modifies the enactment of regulations, or the enactment of statutes).  
 127. See T.D. 9511, 2011-1 C.B. 455. 
 128. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) (2012). 
 129. See Arlington v. FCC, 688 F.3d 229, 248 (5th Cir. 2012) (noting circuit split on the 
question), cert. granted, 2012 U.S. LEXIS 7807 (2012); Bressman, supra note 87, at 1472-
74. The Supreme Court has not given direct guidance on the issue, but in at least two cases 
has answered arguably jurisdictional questions on plain meaning grounds, thereby obviat-
ing the deference question. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
142 (2000); MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994).  
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actively under pre-1996 Section 7805(b) or under the prevention of 
abuse standard would receive deference.  
 One might object that the notion of a retroactive rule is simply 
nonsensical. Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Bowen asserts 
that under the APA there is no such thing as a retroactive rule.130 As 
Justice Scalia argues, adjudication is retroactive, whereas rulemak-
ing has prospective effect.131 What this dichotomy misses is the possi-
bility of overlap. If guidance is of general applicability and both ret-
roactive and prospective effect, then it does have prospective effect. 
In any event, it should not be necessary to pigeonhole the idea of a 
retroactive tax rule into the APA’s definition of rulemaking. The 
Court has held that Congress may choose the procedures for agency 
action, creating hybrid procedures distinct from the APA. For exam-
ple, in Florida East Coast Railway, the Court approved of a proce-
dure for certain boxcar tolls requiring both rulemaking and a hear-
ing.132 Section 7805(b) clearly contemplates the possibility of a rule 
the effective date of which precedes the rule’s promulgation. 
 Assuming a retroactive regulation is procedurally valid, what 
standard of judicial deference applies? The central thesis of Mead is 
that if Congress would expect courts to defer to the agency’s filling a 
gap with the type of guidance at issue Chevron applies.133 Mayo has 
held that notice and comment Treasury regulations merit Chevron
deference.134 It makes little sense that Congress would not expect the 
same deference for the retroactive regulations that it has authorized in 
Section 7805(b). Indeed, retroactivity in and of itself has not been a 
reason to withhold deference outside the tax context: courts defer to an 
agency’s position adopted in formal adjudications and to an agency’s  
interpretation of its own guidance adopted in a brief filed in litigation.135
                                                                                                                  
 130. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 216-17 (1988) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (“The only plausible reading of the italicized phrase is that rules have legal conse-
quences only for the future. It could not possibly mean that merely some of their legal con-
sequences must be for the future, though they may also have legal consequences for the 
past, since that description would not enable rules to be distinguished from ‘orders,’ and 
would thus destroy the entire dichotomy upon which the most significant portions of the 
APA are based. (Adjudication—the process for formulating orders—has future as well as 
past legal consequences, since the principles announced in an adjudication cannot be de-
parted from in future adjudications without reason.”) (citation omitted)). 
 131. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 216-19.  
 132. United States v. Florida E. Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224, 245-46 (1973) (“Here, the 
incentive payments proposed by the Commission in its tentative order, and later adopted 
in its final order, were applicable across the board to all of the common carriers by railroad 
subject to the Interstate Commerce Act. No effort was made to single out any particular 
railroad for special consideration based on its own peculiar circumstances. . . . The factual 
inferences were used in the formulation of a basically legislative-type judgment, for pro-
spective application only, rather than in adjudicating a particular set of disputed facts.”). 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. 
 134. See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704,  
712-13 (2011). 
 135. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001). 
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 Professor Lederman proposes that the facts surrounding the issu-
ance of guidance, including retroactivity and unfair delay, should be 
a factor in arbitrary and capricious review under either Skidmore or 
Chevron, whichever is applicable.136 In the context of Chevron defer-
ence, which would apply to notice and comment regulations, Leder-
man would take this into account as part of the arbitrary and capri-
cious review of Step 2.137 Though the proposal is analytically sound, I 
would emphasize the limits of the test. It is unlikely that a clarifica-
tion, even if retroactive, would be invalid.138 The principal challenge 
for the Treasury would appear to be changing a clear and firmly-
established interpretation retroactively; in some instances, this could 
be arbitrary and capricious or, possibly, void for vagueness.139
B.   Temporary Regulations 
 The IRS often has issued temporary regulations without notice 
and comment, finalizing the regulations after subsequently receiving 
comments (the “interim-final” method).140 Professor Hickman has 
criticized the interim-final method, arguing that it ordinarily violates 
the APA’s requirement of prior notice and comment.141 Hickman also 
has argued not only that a temporary regulation is invalid, but that 
it may taint the final regulation to which it relates, assuming no APA 
exception applies, such as for “good cause” or interpretative rules.142
 As Hickman explains, some courts have excused APA procedural 
flaws where post-promulgation comments evidenced an “open mind” 
toward comments or where undoing the regulations would not make 
a substantive difference.143 Nevertheless, other courts are more con-
cerned that making exceptions will gut the APA’s notice and com-
ment requirement.144 Hickman argues that the Court should not en-
gender chaos by invalidating hundreds of regulations that have been 
adopted in this manner.145 Nevertheless, Hickman persuasively ob-
serves that a temporary regulation adopted in the midst of litigation 
                                                                                                                  
 136. See Lederman, supra note 3, at 700. 
 137. Id. at 697-98. 
 138. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 1836, 1852 (2012) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (no impermissible retroactivity if “interpretation” of a provision “without an 
established meaning” rather than “change” occurs). 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 62-64. 
 140. See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 4, at 1759.  
 141. See id. at 1760. 
 142. See Hickman Brief, supra note 3, at 26. The good cause exception is intended to be 
very narrow. As Hickman explains, “the good cause exception exists principally to give 
agencies flexibility in dealing with emergencies and typographical errors, plus the occa-
sional situation in which advance notice would be counterproductive.” See Hickman, supra
note 4, at 1782.  
 143. See Hickman Brief, supra note 3, at 27. 
 144. See id.
 145. See id. at 28. 
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is too fundamentally flawed, because it will not foster meaningful 
public participation in the rulemaking process.146
 Although I generally agree with Hickman’s position, there is a 
stronger argument for upholding temporary regulations, and it would 
not invalidate litigation-oriented temporary regulations. The APA’s 
notice and comment procedure147 makes perfect sense under a work-
ing assumption that a rule cannot be retroactive. Indeed, the APA 
requires publication of a rule before the “effective date” of the rule.148
This is flatly inconsistent with the Code’s grant of retroactive rule-
making power. Under the current general grant to the Treasury of 
rulemaking authority, regulations ordinarily may apply to periods as 
early as the public has notice of the expected contents of the regula-
tion.149 Moreover, under the old grant, retroactivity was the default. 
If the IRS’s position is correct, the old grant applies to regulations 
relating to most sections of the Code.150
 If most tax regulations are legislative and the APA’s good cause 
exception rarely applies, then a literal reading of the APA’s notice 
and comment requirements would practically obliterate Section 
7805(b). For example, the literal reading of the APA would imply that 
regulations under a brand new code section cannot take effect before 
the comment process has been completed and a final regulation is-
sues, unless they are interpretative or qualify for the good cause ex-
ception, neither of which is likely. A more persuasive reading, in my 
view, is that in the context of tax administration, Congress wishes to 
incentivize notice to taxpayers of the rules to which they will be sub-
ject. Accordingly, the IRS should not be penalized for giving notice of 
its intentions early if it then solicits comments in a reasonable manner.  
 To approach the matter from a different angle, consider that agen-
cies other than the Treasury Department generally have not been 
granted the authority to promulgate retroactive regulations.151 For 
those agencies, the invalidation of a regulation on procedural 
grounds would have more impact. Under the APA, absent a court’s 
exercise of remedial discretion, the fact that the public has notice of 
an agency’s intentions to make a rule is irrelevant to the permissible 
effective date of the rule.152 However, this is a situation where tax is 
exceptional, because the Code explicitly provides for tax regulations 
with an effective date prior to the enactment of final regulations.  
                                                                                                                  
 146. See id. at 30. 
 147. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d) (2006). 
 148. Id.
 149. See I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(C) (2012). 
 150. See supra text accompanying notes 126-28. 
 151. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). 
 152. See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion 
in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 299 (2003) (noting that courts have sometimes 
exercised discretion to avoid disruptions when a rule falls to a procedural challenge). 
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 Assuming temporary regulations are valid, what standard of judi-
cial deference would apply? Temporary regulations, at least for a 
time, are binding. However, while the regulation is still temporary, it 
will implicitly not have gone through meaningful public participation 
that could be reflected in the rule. Therefore, Skidmore is probably the 
correct standard of judicial deference to apply to a temporary regulation. 
Home Concrete and several other cases involved a common fact 
pattern.153 The taxpayers engaged in tax shelter transactions leading 
to an overstatement of basis.154 In general, the statute of limitations 
on assessment of tax is three years, but in the case of a substantial 
understatement of income, a six-year statute of limitations applies.155
The IRS issued retroactive temporary regulations on this matter, 
which were finalized after receiving only one comment.156 The regula-
tions specified that an overstatement of basis constitutes an omission 
from gross income for purposes of the six-year statute of limitations.157
Effectively, this reopened tax years that were closed, assuming that 
the three-year statute of limitations applied before the regulations  
were finalized. 
 The Supreme Court in 1958 had held that overstated basis was 
not an omission for purposes of the predecessor to the current statute 
of limitations on assessment.158 However, the IRS claimed Chevron
deference under Brand X.159 As discussed above, Brand X allows an 
agency to adopt a construction of a statute, even if it differs from the 
construction that a court has previously adopted, so long as the stat-
ute is not unambiguous. Thus, an initial issue is whether the statute 
of limitations is ambiguous. Circuits split on this Chevron step 1 issue 
of ambiguity.160
 The Court, however, decided the case at step 1, relying on the Col-
ony precedent.161 Invalidating the regulations as contrary to statute 
rendered questions under the APA procedural rules and judicial def-
erence doctrines superfluous. Thus, it remains unclear what the Court 
thinks about validity of and deference applicable to temporary regula-
tions in general, or retroactive temporary regulations in particular.  
 Justice Kennedy, writing in dissent for four justices, focused pri-
marily on the issue of whether there was statutory ambiguity.162 Jus-
tice Kennedy argued that statutory amendments not considered in 
                                                                                                                  
 153. See Lederman, supra note 3, at 679.  
 154. See United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1836 (2012). 
 155. I.R.C. § 6501(a), (e)(1)(A) (2012). 
 156. See Hickman Brief, supra note 3, at 31. 
 157. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1842.  
 158. See id.
 159. Id. at 255-56. 
 160. See Lederman, supra note 3, at 681-87 (describing the holdings of the Circuit courts). 
 161. Home Concrete, 132 S. Ct. at 1836-37. 
 162. Id. at 1849. 
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Colony left interpretive space for the Treasury’s new interpreta-
tion.163 After concluding that the statute was ambiguous, Justice 
Kennedy tersely observed that the Treasury’s interpretation was 
“reasonable,” citing Mayo.164 Moreover, as a “clarification” or “inter-
pretation,” the interpretation did not “upset legitimate settled expec-
tations” or “have an impermissible retroactive effect.”165
 Thus, at least four justices in Home Concrete would have held that 
Chevron deference applied to interim-final regulations that clarified 
rules applying to prior tax years. However, Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
provides very little insight into the reasoning behind the dissent’s 
conclusions concerning the APA and deference doctrines, and the ma-
jority opinion does not address these issues at all.  
C.   Revenue Rulings 
 Revenue rulings are interpretations published in the Internal 
Revenue Bulletin by the IRS, without undergoing notice and com-
ment. Revenue rulings generally apply rules to specific factual situa-
tions. The IRS does not claim the same authority for revenue rulings as 
Treasury regulations, yet they are still binding to some degree. In gen-
eral, revenue rulings apply retroactively and prospectively, unless the 
IRS exercises its discretion to apply the authority prospectively only.166
 Because disregard of a revenue ruling may lead to penalties, it 
makes sense to think of a revenue ruling as binding, even if the IRS 
labels a revenue ruling as being less binding than a regulation.167
Therefore, a revenue ruling should be procedurally valid only if it is 
interpretative rather than legislative, because the ruling will not  
undergo APA notice and comment or a similar procedure. 
 The appropriate standard of judicial deference for a revenue rul-
ing is Skidmore. Although revenue rulings probably have enough 
force of law to qualify under Chevron, they do not undergo the kind of 
process that Congress would expect to receive deference. 
D.   Litigating Positions 
 The Supreme Court repeatedly has applied Auer deference to an 
agency’s interpretations of an agency’s own authorities, even if the 
interpretation is advanced in a brief in litigation. In Auer, the Su-
preme Court held that a reviewing court owed deference to the Secre-
                                                                                                                  
 163. Id. at 1850-51. 
 164. Id. at 1852.  
 165. Id. at 1853.
 166. I.R.C. § 7805(b)(8) (2012). 
 167. See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b)(1) (2012). 
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tary of Labor’s interpretation of a regulation, unless the interpreta-
tion was “plainly erroneous.”168
 A key issue is whether the agency claiming Auer deference is really 
interpreting preexisting guidance rather than generating new guid-
ance. An agency cannot simply “parrot” the statute it is charged with 
implementing in a regulation and then claim Auer deference for its 
interpretation of the statute; the agency must use its expertise to en-
act an interpretation that it subsequently interprets.169 In the tax 
context, some regulations do little more than repeat the relevant 
Code section; subsequent interpretations of those regulations should 
not be eligible for Auer deference.170
IV.   CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON RETROACTIVITY
 As this Article has discussed, certain IRS modalities may validly—at 
least under the Code—take effect retroactively. This Part examines 
whether this statutory flexibility is unconstitutional. In short, alt-
hough there may be outlier examples, retroactivity generally has not 
been suspect under the Constitution. Since the early twentieth century 
Lochner-era high water mark of judicial review of economic legislation, 
the Supreme Court has not found a tax unconstitutional on account of 
retroactivity. In addition, more generally beyond tax, the Supreme 
Court’s review of retroactivity has been extremely deferential. 
 Two analytical frameworks may be relevant where retroactive tax 
rules impose an economic burden on a taxpayer: substantive due pro-
cess and regulatory takings.171 Although the matter is not free from 
doubt, the proper doctrine within which to situate review is the sub-
stantive guarantee of the Due Process Clause. That said, it makes 
little difference whether one looks to substantive due process or regu-
latory takings jurisprudence. Under either framework, the post-Lochner
era decisions of the Court have invalidated only shockingly unfair 
retroactivity involving arguably unforeseeable liabilities. 
                                                                                                                  
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102. 
 169.  See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006).
 170. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a). Just because the Treasury has summarized the 
Section 61 definition of “gross income” in a final regulation does not mean that its liti-
gating positions with respect to what constitutes income will be reviewed on a “plainly 
erroneous” standard.
 171. See generally Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Expropriatory Intent: Defining the Proper 
Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L. REV. 713 (2002). 
Additional constitutional guarantees limit the government’s ability to impose criminal 
liability for tax misconduct. Although it is beyond the scope of this Article, the Ex Post 
Facto Clause and vagueness doctrines will probably limit retroactivity in criminal matters 
far more than in civil matters. 
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A.   Substantive Due Process 
 The latest pronouncement from the Supreme Court on the ques-
tion whether substantive due process is violated by retroactivity is 
Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel.172 The Supreme Court’s decision in East-
ern Enterprises is also the perfect showcase for the question of which 
analytical framework applies when new rules deprive a person of 
money but not a specific property or use of property. Piecing together 
the opinions in the 4-1-4 decision, five justices embraced substantive 
due process as the correct analytical framework,173 but only Justice 
Kennedy was convinced that the guarantee was violated by the ret-
roactive imposition of a liability.174 The four other justices that ap-
plied substantive due process analysis concluded that even reaching 
back over multiple decades to impose a new multimillion-dollar lia-
bility was foreseeable and constitutionally unassailable.175 Only four 
justices looked to regulatory takings doctrine, but combined with 
Justice Kennedy’s substantive due process vote, a majority held in 
favor of Eastern Enterprises.176
 Justice Kennedy dismissed the Coal Act’s imposition of “a stagger-
ing financial burden” on Eastern Enterprises as a trigger for the Tak-
ings Clause, because the law did not “operate upon or alter an identi-
fied property interest, and it [was] not applicable to or measured by a 
property interest.”177 Similarly, the Coal Act did not “encumber an 
estate in land . . . , a valuable interest in an intangible . . . , or even a 
bank account or accrued interest.”178 Because the Coal Act was “indif-
ferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the property 
it uses to do so,”179 there was no issue under the Takings Clause.180 As 
Professor Krotoszynski writes, Justice Kennedy’s test for a takings 
claim appears to search for “a specific res that the government seeks 
to seize or control.”181
                                                                                                                  
 172. 524 U.S. 498 (1998). 
 173. Id. at 504. 
 174. See infra text accompanying notes 177-81. 
 175. See infra text accompanying notes 201-06. 
 176. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 503-51. 
 177. Id. at 540. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 178. Id.
 179. Id.
 180. Id. (“To the extent it affects property interests, it does so in a manner similar to 
many laws; but until today, none were thought to constitute takings. To call this sort of 
governmental action a taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise 
and, with all due respect, unwise.”). 
 181. See Krotoszynski, supra note 171, at 745. Krotoszynski persuasively defends Justice 
Kennedy’s approach and explains what is really at stake:  
  In Justice Kennedy’s view, the Supreme Court should avoid an open-ended 
approach to the Takings Clause because it would require federal courts routine-
ly to engage in “normative considerations about the wisdom of government de-
cisions.” As Justice Kennedy properly notes, the Takings Clause does not limit 
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 As the facts will demonstrate, it is telling about the narrow scope 
of substantive due process that Eastern Enterprises was such a close 
decision. In 1992, Congress enacted the Coal Industry Retiree Health 
Benefit Act, imposing health benefit funding obligations on entities 
that employed or had employed coal miners, even in the distant 
past.182 Before the act, a series of voluntary industry agreements ne-
gotiated with unions were responsible for funding health benefits be-
ginning in the 1940s.183 By the 1970s, the market negotiated funding 
proved inadequate to providing benefits to which the miners believed 
they were entitled.184 In 1988, Congress, the industry, and unions be-
gan working on a plan to reform the area.185 Congress ultimately re-
quired any signatory to the prior health benefit agreements to fund 
comprehensive benefits for retirees; this was true even if the compa-
ny no longer operated in the coal industry.186 The requirement was 
particularly a surprise for many companies because their agreements 
had expressly conditioned benefits on adequate funding under the 
pre-existing mechanism.187
 Writing for four dissenters, Justice Breyer agreed with Justice 
Kennedy that substantive due process is the correct analytical 
framework: “there is no need to torture the Takings Clause to fit this 
case” because “the question involved—the potential unfairness of ret-
roactive liability—finds a natural home in the Due Process Clause, a 
Fifth Amendment neighbor.”188 Applying the Due Process Clause, 
Justice Breyer did not find the Coal Act’s funding provisions to be 
sufficiently arbitrary or unfair to warrant invalidation. He 
reached this conclusion because “the relationship between Eastern 
                                                                                                                  
the scope of permissible government action; rather, it merely requires the gov-
ernment to pay for the property interests that it takes. If the question present-
ed goes to the basic fairness or legitimacy of the government’s policy, rather 
than the question of compensation, a reviewing court should employ the Due 
Process Clause rather than the Takings Clause.  
  Justice Kennedy’s policy arguments are quite sound and his demarcation of 
the line between takings claims and substantive due process claims makes a 
great deal of sense. When government acts in a way that affects a particular 
property interest, and does so intentionally, expropriatory intent may well be 
present. But the specificity of the government’s action vis-a-vis a property in-
terest will not invariably indicate a government action that is tantamount to an 
expropriation. Moreover, as will be discussed in greater detail below, a regula-
tory takings doctrine focused on the specificity of the government’s demand 
could be easily evaded. Thus, Justice Kennedy’s definition of a taking does not 
entirely foreclose the plurality’s analysis of the Coal Act.  
Id. at 745-46 (footnotes omitted). 
 182. E. Enters., 524 U.S. at 513. 
 183. Id. at 504-06. 
 184. Id. at 508-10. 
 185. Id. at 511-12. 
 186. Id. at 514. 
 187. Id. at 507-08. 
 188. Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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and the payments demanded by the Coal Act is special enough to 
pass the Constitution’s fundamental fairness test.”189 The special 
relationship was due to the fact that Eastern Enterprises arguably 
benefited from the miners’ labor and had made promises to them to 
provide health benefits, notwithstanding the fact that the promises 
were legally unenforceable.190
 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, in contrast, purports to apply ra-
tionality review, but clearly does so with somewhat more bite than 
typical rationality review. Justice Kennedy notes that due process 
prevents retroactivity from being imposed in an “arbitrary and irra-
tional way.”191 Although this may sound exactly like the lenient 
standard of review typically applied to prospective economic legisla-
tion, Justice Kennedy suggests cryptically that “justifications for the 
latter may not suffice for the former.”192 Ultimately, Justice Kennedy 
finds the Coal Act’s retroactive imposition of liability “bears no legit-
imate relation to the interest which the Government asserts in the 
support of the statute.”193 The thirty-five year time frame appears to 
be key to this conclusion; Justice Kennedy reminds, “Statutes may be 
invalidated on due process grounds only under the most egregious of 
circumstances. This case represents one of the rare instances in 
which even such a permissive standard has been violated.”194
 Tax cases in the post-Lochner era have sounded the same permis-
sive substantive due process themes. In the latest Supreme Court 
case on retroactive taxation, the Court held that a retroactive 
amendment of the estate tax did not violate substantive due pro-
cess.195 In 1985, before a later amendment, the Code allowed a deduc-
tion of half the proceeds of a sale of securities to an employee stock 
ownership plan.196 The scope of the deduction was a mistake; Congress 
had intended to limit the deduction to stock already owned by the 
decedent.197 Wilmetta Kay’s executor, Jerry Carlton, purchased mil-
lions of dollars worth of stock, which he then sold, thereby reducing 
Kay’s estate tax due by approximately $2.5 million.198 The IRS pub-
lished a policy of disallowing the deduction where the decedent had 
not owned stock prior to death, and Congress followed by retroactive-
ly enacting the “decedent ownership requirement.”199 Thus, assuming 
                                                                                                                  
 189. Id. at 559. 
 190. Id. at 559-61. 
 191. Id. at 547 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 192. Id. at 548 (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976)). 
 193. Id. at 549. 
 194. Id. at 549-50. 
 195. United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 35 (1994). 
 196. Id. at 28. 
 197. Id. at 29. 
 198. Id. at 28. 
 199. Id. at 29. 
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the revision was constitutional, Kay’s estate owed a large additional 
estate tax liability. 
 Carlton’s due process challenge failed in district court but suc-
ceeded on appeal in the Ninth Circuit.200 The Ninth Circuit placed 
substantial weight on the taxpayer’s actual reliance on the loophole 
and lack of notice.201 The Supreme Court reversed, noting that the 
“due process standard to be applied to tax statutes with retroactive 
effect, therefore, is the same as that generally applicable to retroac-
tive economic legislation.”202 Specifically, “[p]rovided that the retroac-
tive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative 
purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of 
such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legisla-
tive and executive branches.”203
 The Court found Congress’ purpose of correcting a mistake legiti-
mate, and observed that a period of a little more than a year was a 
“modest” period of retroactivity.204 Presumably, the period of retroac-
tivity relates to the rationality of the means of effecting a legitimate 
purpose. The short period at issue in Carlton made the decision easy, 
in light of Welch v. Henry, which approved of a two-year period of ret-
roactivity for a state income tax amendment, taxing previously tax-
exempt dividends.205 Carlton was, perhaps, even easier because it in-
volved a correction rather than a wholly new tax, as in Welch v. Henry.
Moreover, the Court disavowed Lochner-era retroactivity cases inval-
idating retroactive taxes: “Those cases were decided during an era 
characterized by exacting review of economic legislation under an 
approach that ‘has long since been discarded.’ ”206
 Although the Court has repeatedly blessed “modest” retroactivity, 
it has not decided a tax case involving more than modest retroactivity.207
There is much play in the joints between two years’ retroactivity and 
two decades’ retroactivity that the Court’s precedents do not squarely 
address. Justice Scalia observes, however, that the majority’s approach 
will allow any retroactive tax: 
The reasoning the Court applies to uphold the statute in this case 
guarantees that all retroactive tax laws will henceforth be valid. 
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To pass constitutional muster the retroactive aspects of the statute 
need only be “rationally related to a legitimate legislative pur-
pose.” Revenue raising is certainly a legitimate legislative purpose, 
and any law that retroactively adds a tax, removes a deduction, or 
increases a rate rationally furthers that goal.208
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia is probably exaggerating the weakness of 
the narrow tailoring prong; the majority may not be imposing much 
bite, but surely there is a nibble at the margins. 
 It is impossible to be sure whether Justice Scalia’s warning is  
correct—that there is no substantive due process in taxation. This 
Article posits that there are limits, but they are yet to be discovered. 
The Court’s existing jurisprudence seems to envision a sliding scale 
where there is more latitude to make clarifications and amendments 
than wholly new taxes, and where pre-tax profit expectations reduce 
the scope of retroactivity. For example, could a new national sales tax 
constitutionally attach to transactions occurring within the last ten 
years? Probably not, but the political process presumably would keep 
a wholly new retroactive tax from reaching far back to burden com-
monplace non-tax motivated transactions. In borderline cases, where 
there is simply an amendment within an existing scheme of taxation 
(e.g., income, estate and gift, excise, etc.) or where there is little or no 
reason absent a tax benefit to engage in a transaction, the reach of 
retroactivity is less clear; moreover, it is less clear that the political 
process can be relied upon to protect the taxpayer.209 Yet the Court’s 
substantive due process jurisprudence on retroactivity, grounded in 
its permissive review of economic legislation, seems to invite just 
that: the taxpayer’s protection is the political process in all cases but 
those featuring the most shocking government action.  
 Just this year, the Court reaffirmed that a very narrow standard 
of review applies to classifications in taxation. Although not precisely 
on point, Armour v. City of Indianapolis210 may be telling for the 
Court’s receptivity—or lack thereof—to due process claims based on 
retroactivity. In 2005, Indianapolis adopted a new assessment and 
payment method and forgave any Barrett Law installments (related 
to apportioned costs of sewer improvements) that lot owners still 
owed.211 Owners who had prepaid their entire assessment claimed 
that the city’s refusal to provide a refund violated the Equal Protec-
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tion Clause.212 Applying rational basis review (without bite), the 
Court concluded that administrative convenience justified failure  
to provide a refund of prepaid assessments.213 Three justices, in dis-
sent, would have held that the gross differential taxation, weighed 
against the ease of processing a refund, was a violation of the Equal  
Protection Clause.214
 The Armour dissenters’ concern with gross differences in taxation 
is actually a reason that supports retroactive rules—they apply the 
same rules to similarly situated taxpayers.215 Prospective-only rules 
give more notice, but treat similarly situated taxpayers differently. 
Perhaps it is impossible to perfectly balance the values of equal  
protection with due process values in taxation. The Supreme Court 
appears to have left these trade-offs largely to the discretion of Con-
gress, states, and agencies. 
B.   Regulatory Taking 
 As discussed above, although there is a shaky doctrinal basis for 
doing so, in Eastern Enterprises Justice O’Connor’s four-justice plu-
rality opinion applied the three-part test for regulatory takings first 
enunciated in Penn Central to a retroactive liability for health bene-
fits imposed on a coal mining company.216 It is unclear whether this is 
simply sui generis or whether the Court will again embrace this unu-
sual application of the Takings Clause. As Justice Kennedy noted, 
the Court had never applied Penn Central except where a “specific 
property right or interest has been at stake.”217
 Under the Penn Central regulatory takings test, a reviewing court 
must consider “the economic impact of the regulation on the claim-
ant,” “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations,” and “the character of the govern-
mental action.”218 Surprisingly, given this landscape, Justice 
O’Connor regarded the Supreme Court’s essential task as making an 
inquiry into basic notions of “justice and fairness,”219 which is tradi-
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tionally the domain of substantive due process.220 In this regard, Jus-
tice O’Connor observes, if “severe retroactive liability [is imposed] on 
a limited class of parties that could not have anticipated the liability, 
and the extent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to 
the parties’ experience,” it violates the Takings Clause.221
 Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion summarily checks off each ele-
ment of the Penn Central test.222 First, the Coal Act’s multimillion-dollar 
economic impact on Eastern Enterprises was “considerable” and 
“substantial.”223 Moreover, “the company is clearly deprived of the 
amounts it must pay the Combined Fund.”224 This observation about 
deprivation is clearly and always true of financial exactions, and ob-
scures the prior history of regulatory takings cases inquiring into the 
extent of a deprivation of property or the use of property. The opinion 
concludes that the Coal Act interferes with “reasonable investment 
backed expectations” and that the “nature of the governmental ac-
tion” is “quite unusual.”225 These conclusions appear to be simultane-
ous with one another; the action is quite unusual because it is retro-
active, and it interferes with reasonable expectations because it is 
retroactive. What is conspicuously omitted is an inquiry into what 
expectations are “reasonable.” One could have simultaneously found 
that it is foreseeable to have liability from an employment relation-
ship in a high-risk industry, and therefore the action was not all  
that unusual. 
 Justice O’Connor underscores that even under the Takings 
Clause, the plaintiff bears a “substantial” burden.226 The trouble for 
the government, or the opportunity for the plaintiff, is that in the 
analysis of regulatory takings of money, the courts are in essentially 
uncharted waters. Even if the burden under the regulatory takings 
analysis should be approximately the same as under the due process 
analysis, a court applying the test will be left with far more discre-
tion. The institutional effect of switching from a precedent-laden area 
to a new and unsettled area is, as Professor Krotoszynski explains,  
potentially great:  
Over time, precedents would develop that delimit how and when 
government acts with expropriatory intent. As these cases begin to 
accrue, judges wishing to depart from earlier precedents arbitrari-
ly will find undertaking such a task increasingly difficult. Because 
the essence of the art of judging is giving reasons in support of re-
sults, the de facto discretion of judges to apply the expropriatory 
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intent requirement in an arbitrary fashion would recede over time 
as the precedents defining and applying the standard became more 
numerous. In the end, as Justice Frankfurter once explained, “The 
ultimate reliance for the fair operation of any standard is a judici-
ary of high competence and character and the constant play of an 
informed professional critique upon its work.”227
Thus, for deprivations of money, a regulatory taking claim may be 
more powerful than a substantive due process claim. It bears repeat-
ing, however, that Eastern Enterprise’s regulatory takings analysis did 
not garner five votes. 
C.   The Presumption Against Retroactive Application of Statutes 
 The Supreme Court has developed common law principles con-
cerning whether to apply an unclear statute retroactively or only pro-
spectively. By all accounts, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in this 
area is confusing, including continual U-turns and backpedaling over 
the years. Professor Basset writes, “A careful analysis of the Court’s 
decisions reveals a consistent approach to retroactive legislation—an 
approach ultimately based in fundamental principles of fairness, but 
which has been masked by the Court’s terminology.”228 One confusing 
aspect of the decisions is superficially mandatory language that is 
sometimes taken out of context. 
 As an example, the Supreme Court has suggested that a statute 
“may not” be applied retroactively to revive an old and cold claim 
that is time barred. In Hughes Aircraft, the Court in dictum approv-
ingly referenced the conclusion of Chenault, a Ninth Circuit case that 
“a newly enacted statute that lengthens the applicable statute of lim-
itations may not be applied retroactively to revive a plaintiff’s claim 
that was otherwise barred under the old statutory scheme because to 
do so would alter the substantive rights of a party and increase a par-
ty’s liability.”229 Neither of these cases, however, involved a constitu-
tional claim. The words “may not” sometimes mean simply that an  
interpretation is foreclosed under a statute being interpreted, not that 
the effect, if it had been clearly legislated, would be unconstitutional. 
 The statutory interpretation cases were not directed toward, and 
should not be imported into, substantive due process or arbitrary and 
capricious analysis.230 Congress has clearly provided authority for 
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retroactive tax rules in Section 7805(b).231 Moreover, the IRS is gen-
erally punctilious about specifying the effective date for a section of 
the Regulations, sometimes applying different effective dates for dif-
ferent paragraphs. If a tax rule is retroactive, arbitrary and capri-
cious review should require an explanation of the need for retroactiv-
ity, and in extreme cases constitutional claims may be successful. 
 In sum, the Court has rejected, under one theory or another, con-
stitutional challenges against all but the most shocking and egre-
gious retroactivity. That is true even when the rules are completely 
new. There is, to be sure, a gray area between cases that have clearly 
approved two years of tax retroactivity and cases that have barely 
struck down decades of non-tax retroactivity. The signals from a ma-
jority of the Court, however, suggest that a few years of tax retroac-
tivity would be acceptable, even for a wholly new rule. Moreover, in 
many situations, retroactivity will not come in the form of a wholly 
new rule, but will instead be more in the nature of a clarification of 
an unclear area. There may also be bad faith on the part of the tax-
payer, which could lead a court to conclude that retroactivity is not 
conscience shocking, fundamentally unfair, or unforeseeable under 
the circumstances. 
V. OUTLINE OF REFORM OPTIONS
 Although the idea of combining functions in agencies is nothing 
new,232 it is likely that the public would object especially to reducing 
the role of the courts in the adjudication of tax controversies. To the 
extent that the IRS receives deference for tax guidance—particularly 
retroactive tax guidance—the role of courts diminishes. Accordingly, 
this Part briefly sketches a comparison of potential reforms of the  
current system. 
A.   No Change 
 The strength of judicial review as a protection for the taxpayer 
depends on the government’s process in creating and disseminating 
tax guidance. As discussed above, the IRS and Treasury have at their 
disposal a variety of modalities in which to make policy, but some of 
these modalities will receive less judicial deference than others. Alt-
hough the proposition is not entirely free from doubt, tax guidance 
issued without notice and comment should probably receive only 
Skidmore deference rather than Chevron deference. Of course, the 
government is free to use notice and comment procedures and receive 
Chevron deference. Thus, at least in this respect, the taxpayer’s pro-
tection from abuse primarily lies outside of the courts.   
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 Even though the Treasury’s use of notice and comment rulemak-
ing process will often limit the role of judicial review of tax controver-
sies, this does not leave the taxpayer completely unprotected. The 
rights to notice and to make comments do not guarantee the best out-
come to any particular taxpayer, but they do afford interested parties 
a chance to air their views and to build a record more favorable to 
their position. The government, in turn, must consider the comments 
and have a reasoned explanation in order to survive an arbitrary and 
capricious challenge. The IRS’s past procedures have been defi-
cient,233 but the IRS has acknowledged that it will need to internalize 
Mayo’s command to follow general principles of administrative law.234
Assuming that the IRS does adhere to the APA more diligently in the 
future, taxpayers will have a better chance to have their views heard, 
but this is no guarantee they will be pleased with the decision the IRS 
adopts. And again, assuming the IRS makes better use of notice and 
comment rulemaking, its actions should receive Chevron deference 
from reviewing courts. 
 Perhaps the most powerful constraint on unfair action by the IRS 
is the political process. Unlike courts, agencies are subject to over-
sight by Congress and supervision by the President. Therefore, the 
public can indirectly bring pressure to bear on the IRS through elect-
ed officials, even though the public does not have direct influence on 
the IRS. Congress has often threatened, at least implicitly, to de-fund 
an agency that is not responsive to its concerns.235 Indeed, the notice 
and comment rulemaking process serves an important function in  
facilitating congressional supervision of the agency.236 These con-
straints limit the extent to which the IRS would engage in truly arbi-
trary enforcement of the tax laws.  
 Retaining the status quo has the benefit of allowing the IRS flexi-
bility to respond to unanticipated abuse of the tax system. But that 
flexibility is at the same time its curse; it is often said that American 
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culture is distrustful of government, and particularly distrustful of 
the taxing power.237 Given how cumbersome the federal political pro-
cess is, taxpayers may not be satisfied with a political check on the 
IRS. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider other potential solutions. By 
process of elimination—if agency processes and the political process 
are bracketed as not completely satisfactory—a solution must involve 
shifting responsibility for the tax laws to the courts. 
B.   Restructure Tax Litigation 
 The current tax litigation process is byzantine, leads to forum 
shopping, and obtains different results for similarly situated taxpay-
ers.238 After the IRS has identified a deficiency in income reported on 
the taxpayer’s tax return and notified the taxpayer of its finding, the 
taxpayer has essentially two routes available. One option is to con-
test the deficiency without paying the additional tax liability; in this 
situation, the taxpayer must litigate in Tax Court.239 The other option 
is to pay the deficiency and then sue for a refund. The taxpayer may 
sue for a refund in district court or the Court of Federal Claims.240 In 
many cases, the primary reason for suing for a refund rather than 
litigating in Tax Court is to benefit from having a non-specialist 
judge in district court hear the case, or to be bound by the precedents 
of the Federal Circuit, which apply in the Court of Federal Claims.241
 In Tax Court, specialist judges will adjudicate; in refund court, 
generalist judges will adjudicate. Presumably, the decision reached 
by a tax specialist will often differ from the decision reached by a 
generalist. Though not empirically proven, this is certainly received 
wisdom among tax lawyers.242 Assuming that a drawback of allowing 
courts to exercise primary decisionmaking authority is lack of exper-
tise, that concern is less forceful in the case of the Tax Court. In other 
words, its institutional advantages include independence and expertise. 
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 Given these differences in Tax Court and refund courts, Congress 
might enact legislation consolidating tax controversies in the Tax 
Court, ending or limiting deference by the Tax Court to the IRS and 
Treasury’s guidance, and instructing appellate courts to defer to Tax 
Court’s decisions.243 In the 1940s, before Dobson v. Commissioner244
was legislatively overruled,245 appellate courts were instructed to de-
fer to the Tax Court on legal questions, but the courts resisted doing 
so.246 Moreover, tax and nontax law may be able to benefit from one 
another; this cross-pollination would arguably be hindered by remov-
ing trials of tax controversies from generalist courts.247
 Even if appellate courts were to defer to Tax Court decisions, 
there would still be a range of discretion. There is a risk that an ap-
pellate court would erroneously conclude that a Tax Court decision 
was unreasonable. Another option would be to simplify the appellate 
system by creating a United States Court of Tax Appeals, which 
would hear appeals from the Tax Court, and remove tax cases from 
district court and the Court of Claims. This was proposed for other 
reasons by the Federal Courts Commission in 1990.248 Besides the 
benefit of additional expertise in the court, taxpayers living in differ-
ent areas of the country would be subject to the same tax precedents.  
 Finally, another option would be to limit deference to the IRS in 
small tax controversies. Income and asset limitations would need to 
be considered. As the sophistication of the taxpayer increases, it is 
more reasonable to charge the taxpayer with anticipating adminis-
trative change and clarification, and to cooperate proactively with  
the tax administration. There may be a compliance benefit in having 
average taxpayers feel that they have a real chance to contest tax 
matters in court.  
VI.   CONCLUSION
 This Article has drawn from general principles of administrative 
law to inform questions surrounding the validity of and deference 
owed to various forms of tax guidance. A focus on the unusual case of 
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retroactive tax rules sheds new light on more typical prospective tax 
guidance. Treasury regulations promulgated with notice and com-
ment, even retroactive regulations, ordinarily should receive Chevron
deference. Other binding authorities, such as revenue rulings and 
regulations issued without notice and comment, ordinarily should 
receive Skidmore deference.  
 The Internal Revenue Code’s unusual grant of retroactive rulemak-
ing power to the Treasury Department means that tax administration 
can be more flexible procedurally than administrative action in gen-
eral. This flexibility, of course, presents a potential for abuse. Accord-
ingly, this Article has considered potential constitutional limitations 
on retroactive tax rules and has sketched potential reforms to shift 
decisionmaking power back to the courts. No solution will eliminate 
the potential for upset expectations in the tax administration; the 
question is really what institution will be the source of clarification  
and change?  
